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1. Introduction
This essay is in honour of Professor dr. Henk Snijder’s multifarious and long-lasting
contributions to the field of dispute resolution over the past quarter-century. It
addresses one of the fundamental internal tensions in democratic enterprises –
curbing managerial authority while remaining a competitive business. It draws
from the latest developments in management discourse to suggest a durable,
organisational approach to ameliorating such disputes in worker cooperatives.
A workers’ cooperative is an autonomous legal person, governed by private law,
which undertakes economic activities in the interest of its worker-members.2 In
general, they democratically participate in the management and control of the
cooperative in exchange for a capital and labour contribution. Members are entitled
to elect a board of directors on a ‘one member, one vote’ basis and to freely express
their views on management.3 While profit is the not their sole purpose, members
1 Prof. mr. drs. I.S. Wuisman is a Professor of Company Law and Head of the Company Law
Department at Leiden Law School, Leiden University and M. Mannan, Bar-at-Law, LLM is a
Researcher in the Company Law Department at Leiden Law School, Leiden University.
2 Precisely defining cooperatives and distinguishing them from stock companies and other forms
of business organisation is a difficult task and we have used a generalised definition of worker
cooperatives that is drawn from section 1.1 of the Draft Principles of European Cooperative Law
(PECOL) (May 2015), available online at: <www.euricse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
PECOL-May-2015.pdf> accessed on 23 February 2016 and inspired by H. Henrÿ, Guidelines for
Cooperative Legislation, 3rd ed. rev., Geneva: ILO 2012. But see ILO, Recommendation No. 193 of
2002 at Paragraph 2 which emphasises that cooperatives are ‘jointly owned’. Otto von Gierke
had an even more expansive definition of cooperatives, and included associations from tribes to
guilds to municipalities. See O. von Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 4 vols, Berlin:
Weidemann, 1868-1913, quoted in M. Lehmann, ‘Cooperatives as Governance Mechanisms’,
ECFR 2014/1, p. 36.
3 ‘Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity
and solidarity.’ They are supposed to be open, distribute surplus in proportion to trade and pay
limited interest on capital. For more information regarding Cooperative Values and the 7
Cooperative Principles, see, International Cooperative Alliance, Cooperative Identity, Values &
Principles, available online at: <http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-
principles> accessed on 25 January 2016. Lehmann makes the less ideological, contractual
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often receive a portion of the surplus revenue of the firm in proportion to their
labour input. In the 20th century, such firms mainly developed in geographical and
industrial ‘clusters’,4 with worker cooperatives becoming prominent in the Basque
region of Spain, Northern Italy and the Northwest USA for manufacturing and
providing construction, taxicab, scavenging and cleaning services. In these past
25 years in particular, professional organisations and firms that are part of the
‘knowledge’ economy have also embraced the worker cooperative model.5 They
have – along with many other reasons – arisen out of workers’ desire to have greater
control over their working life.
Though these firms are managed by, and in the interest of, labour, empirical
studies have shown that there are encouraging signs that they can be as efficient
and productive as conventional limited liability companies that are managed in the
interest of shareholders.6 As workers use their own savings to provide the
cooperative’s capital, they are driven to see the organisation become self-sufficient
and as they collectively participate in a revenue-sharing model, they are sensitive to
argument that as ‘the cooperative stands in the middle between the market and the firm’,
equality of voting (democracy) is similar to equality between parties during offer and acceptance.
See M. Lehmann, ‘Cooperatives as Governance Mechanisms’, ECFR 2014/1, p. 50.
4 For more detail on the development of such clusters, see GK Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’
Control in Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 230ff. More
recently, cooperatives are enjoying a renaissance in the United States, see California’s Assembly Bill
No. 816 of 2015-2016 and the investment of $ 1.2 million by the New York City Government to fund
the development of worker cooperatives. See NCBA CLUSA, ‘New York City Invests $ 1.2 Million In
Worker Cooperatives’ NCBA CLUSA, 27 June 2014, available online at: <www.ncba.coop/ncba-
media/press-releases/610-new-york-city-invests-1-2-million-in-worker-cooperatives> accessed on
22 February 2015.
5 There are a number of such cooperatives represented in the North American ‘Tech Co-op
Network’, <http://techworker.coop/> accessed on 29 February 2016.
6 See, e.g. J.A. Bayo-Moriones, P.J. Galilea-Salvatierra and J.M. de Cerio, ‘Participation, Coope-
ratives and Performance: An Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing Firms’, in T. Kato and J. Pliskin,
Determinants of the Incidence and the Effects of Participatory Organizations: Advances in the
Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, Amsterdam: Elsevier 2003, where a
study of 965 Spanish manufacturing plants revealed that the level of performance of capital-
managed firms and cooperatives was similar. Kruse et al. found that the evidence of sixty
empirical studies reveals a positive association between ‘shared capitalism’ programmes and
company performance, with an average increased productivity of 4.5% as a result of employee
ownership and profit sharing. See D.L. Kruse, J.R. Blasi and R. Park, ‘Shared Capitalism in the US
Economy: Prevalence, Characteristics and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enter-
prises’, in D.L. Kruse, R.B. Freeman and J.R. Blasi (eds.), Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee
Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 2010, p. 44.
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the quality of each other’s work.7 They often pay more than the minimum wage
and offer better working conditions.8 Moreover, there is strong empirical
evidence that such organisations are resilient and in some industries have proven
to be more resistant to failure than conventionally organised firms.9 They
attempt to insulate their members from market shocks to a greater degree than
archetypical companies by, for instance, lowering earnings per member-worker
rather than making a group of them redundant.10 As a form of organisation, it has
an intuitive appeal to social theorists on both sides of the political spectrum, for its
potential to nurture democratic values and solidarity as well as its capacity to
encourage free enterprise.11 Its participatory nature has led some academics to
7 J. Levin and S. Tadelis, ‘Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 2005/120(1), p. 131-171; GK Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in
Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003; H. Hansmann, ‘When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic Democracy’, Yale
Law Journal 1990/99(8), p. 1762.
8 For a recent study on Argentinean cooperatives that demonstrate this notable wage increase, see
I. Albergucci et al., Trabajo auto gestionado y organización politica, Buenos Aires: CTA Ediciones
2009 cited in B. Dobrusin, ‘Workers’ Cooperatives in Argentina: The Self-administered Workers’
Association’, International Journal of Labour Research 2013/5(2), p. 198.
9 A longitudinal study of the Mondragon group of cooperatives conducted in the wake of the 2008
financial recession found that it had the dynamic ability to innovate and adjust to changing
market conditions, even in comparison to conventional firms. See S. Arando et al., ‘Assessing
Mondragon: Stability & Managed Change in the Face of Globalization’, Working Paper Number
1003, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan: 2010 p. 11, 13 available online at:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1726449> accessed on 29 January 2016.
10 See, e.g. J. Pencavel, L. Pistaferri and F. Schivardi, ‘Wages, Employment, and Capital in Capitalist
and Worker-Owned Firms’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2006/60(1), p. 23-44 for a
comparative, empirical study on this issue between Italian companies and Italian co-operatives.
11 For a liberal perspective, see N. Jorman, The Big Society, Buckingham: University of Buckingham
Press, 2010, p. 172-176; H-H. Münkner, The Relationship Between the State and Cooperative in
Cooperative Legislation: Report of a Colloquium Held at Geneva, 14-15 December 1993, Geneva:
Enterprise and Cooperative Development Department, International Labour Office 1994, p. 165;
K. Bradley, ‘Employee Ownership and Economic Decline in Western Industrial Democracies’,
Journal of Management Studies 1986/23(1), p. 52. For a more left-wing stance see, e.g. B. Jossa,
‘Alienation and the Self-Managed Firm System’, Review of Political Economics 2014/46(1); Both
Marx and Lenin believed in the potential of cooperative firms to realise new modes of production
but questioned in its sustainability within the capitalist system. See K. Marx, ‘The Civil War in
France’, in: K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 24, London, Lawrence &Wishart: 1975-
2001, p. 335; K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981, p. 513-514 and VI
Lenin, ‘On Cooperation’, in: Collected Works, Vol. XXXIII, Moscow: Progress Publishers 1923. For
a Parecon, anarchist perspective, see P. Burrows, ‘Parecon and Workers’ Self-Management:
Reflections on Winnipeg’s Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House Collective’, C. Spannos,
Real Utopia: Participatory Society for the 21st Century, Chico CA: AK Press 2008, p. 278.
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postulate that it acts as a form of ‘self-realization’12 and diminishes the alienation
experienced by workers in capitalist enterprises.13
While there are a number of impediments to the formation of a labour-managed
firm,14 once they do form they confront a series of endogenous conflicts. Some
theorists argue that these internal conflicts can lead to the conversion (or
‘degeneration’) of a labour-managed firm into one dominated by a managerial elite
and controlled in the interests of capital,15 as with the 20th century plywood
cooperatives in the Northwest USA.16
In the remainder of this article, we will focus on how conflicts arise in cooperative
workplaces and explore how the democratic and self-determining qualities of
worker cooperatives can be extended after they reach a level of maturity and develop
a complex governance structure. To do so, we will first illustrate the life cycle of de
novo workers’ cooperatives using a simple example.17 We describe a set of
development stages of worker cooperatives. The evolution of cooperatives may
follow different paths and may deviate from the illustration described below.
12 See J. Elster, ‘Self-Realization in Work and Politics’, Social Philosophy and Policy 1986/3(2), p. 97-126.
13 Jossa contends that in cooperatives, ‘workers become buyers of production means instead of
being bought by the owners of them’, B. Jossa, ‘Alienation and the Self-Managed Firm System’,
Review of Political Economics 2014/46(1), p. 9.
14 See J. Schwartz, ‘Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather than the
Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economics’, Ohio
State Law Journal 2012/73(2), p. 219-281 for an overview of the literature on why there are so few
labor-managed firms.
15 For more detail on the degeneration thesis, see R. Spear, ‘Governance in Democratic Member
Based Organisations’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2004/75(1), p. 33-60;
A. Meister, Participation, Associations, Development and Change, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Books, 1984; S. Webb and B. Webb, ‘Co-operative Production and Profit Sharing’, New
Statesman 1914/Special Supplement; B. Potter, The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain,
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1891.
16 The Olympia Veneer Cooperative began operating a plywood mill in the state of Washington,
USA in 1921 with 125 worker-members, each of whom owned shares worth $ 500. As the
business prospered, some of the original worker-members left the company and non-member
workers were hired. By the time the cooperative was sold to the United States Plywood
Corporation, there were 1000 non-member workers and 69 member-workers. Of the 69, 23 of
them received a return of $ 652,000 for their share in the cooperative. For more information, see
Plywood Pioneers Association, ‘Olympic Veneer Company’, Plywood in Retrospect No. 7, Tacoma:
Plywood Pioneers Association 1967 and S. Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and
Evolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006.
17 It should be noted at the outset that this is a generalized model for a cooperative, as some have
differing degrees of workers’ participation, from direct participation to representative partici-
pation to no participation in governance at all. For examples of the latter, see the French SCOP
cooperatives described in E. Batsone, ‘Organization and Orientation: A Life Cycle Model of
French Co-operatives’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 1983/4, p. 139-161. These illustrations
develop upon the ones used in Cooperatives UK, The Worker Cooperative Code, 2012.
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However, this example demonstrates the evolving complexity of the governance
system that may give rise to internal conflicts. As we focus on the internal factors
that cause this, we have not considered external stakeholders such as cooperative
federations, trade unions, financial creditors, the government, outside investors,
political parties and social movements. While a number of financing issues may
also arise, it falls outside of the scope of this article.
2. The Life Cycle of a Workers’ Cooperative
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are friends who live in a mid-sized town and have experience in
making artisanal wooden furniture. Given their shared interest and expertise, they
decide to start a furniture business on a cooperative basis and name it ‘Co-op A’.
They pool their limited savings to rent a small shop, purchase tools, procure initial
supplies and obtain the necessary licenses to start a manufacturing business. At the
outset, they set out their vision for the business, distribute tasks and agree that both
managerial and operational tasks will be rotated amongst themselves periodically.
Given their small size, they decide that they will all be directors of the cooperative,
on an equal voting basis, and that an external accountant will be hired to audit their
accounts and help prepare annual financial reports.
The first stage of their cooperative will therefore look like this:
After a while, Co-op A’s business begins to pick up. Through word-of-mouth, news
about the furniture cooperative spreads across town. One day, three men, 6, 7 and
8, arrive at the shop and express their desire to gain membership of Co-op A. Two
of them have experience in delivering goods and the youngest has a marketing
degree from a local university. After some discussion, the members agree to
include 6, 7 and 8 in the cooperative, in exchange for a capital contribution of EUR
10,000 each and the use of their specific skill sets. At this stage, Co-op A will look
like this:
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A local tabloid photographs a celebrity shopping in the cooperative and Co-op A’s
sales skyrocket. They are unable to cope with demand, with supplies running
short and each member working several hours overtime. They also find that the
original approach of all the workers doing a bit of everything on a rotational basis
was not efficient, was unsatisfying and was not necessary to be equal. They
therefore decide to specialise with each member doing what they do best. During a
weekly meeting, they agree that they need to hire carpenters, 9 and 10, on a
contractual basis and that the member with the university degree has to act as a
manager, for one year to oversee all of the orders and the business’s day-to-day
operations. 2 is appointed as the first manager:
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With the passage of years, Co-op A purchases fixed assets and opens branches
across town. It now has 30 members18 and a dozen blue-collar and office staff. As
the members have a strong bond of trust19 and they wish to better manage the
expansion of the cooperative, they agree to elect three of their own fellow members
as ‘directors’ of the cooperative on an annual basis,20 with the directors being
responsible for overseeing operations and appointing a professional, non-member
manager to purchase raw materials, ensure quality control, market the furniture
and implement decisions made by the board and the members.
3. The Irony of Consensus and the Iron Law of Oligarchy
On the face of it, the cooperative structure of Co-op A should inherently diminish
conflicting interests that exist in conventional firms, such as the conflicts between
investors and workers or the board of directors and workers. By choosing a
18 Cornforth suggests that after 15-20 members, some form of representative democracy is needed.
See C. Cornforth, ‘Patterns of Cooperative Management: Beyond the Degeneration Thesis’,
Economic and Industrial Democracy 1995/16, p. 520. The ICA Group makes a similar suggestion
once a worker cooperative has 12 members. See D. Hammer, ‘Democratic Governance: The
Design of Governance System for Worker Cooperatives’, The ICA Group, p. 13, available online
at: <http://ica-group.org/product/democratic-governance-for-worker-co-ops/> accessed on
23 February 2016.
19 Feelings of trust can be crucial in the decision of a member to delegate his or her decision-
making power to a director. They have to believe that they don’t need to be part of every decision
made. See the interviews of cooperators in G.C. Hunt, ‘Division of Labour, Life Cycle and
Democracy in Worker Co-operatives’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 1992/13, p. 21ff.
20 There is no ideal size of a cooperative Board of Directors, however the ILO recommends that the
minimum should be three and the ICA Group suggests that there should be no more than
twelve. See H. Henrÿ, Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, 3rd ed. rev., Geneva: ILO, 2012, Part
4.3-4.4; D. Hammer, ‘Democratic Governance: The Design of Governance System for Worker
Cooperatives’, The ICA Group, p. 13.
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structure in which the workers possess control rights as members of the coope-
rative on a one-member one-vote basis, the workers have fundamentally sought to
diminish the power imbalances and alienation that exists in conventional firms.
Irony of Consensus
Despite the aim of creating a supportive environment for the benefit of worker-
members, in stage 1 a number of tensions between the members themselves may
arise over the allocation of work and decision-making about the future of the
cooperative. Each member may desire a different balance between profit, job
security, favourable work-scheduling, safety and a congenial social atmosphere.21
As the members are all equal members of the cooperative, all of their views will be
legitimate but it may not be possible to achieve consensus. The heterogeneous
interests can make it costly and difficult to decide on the direction of the firm, as
every decision requires bargaining among the members.22 If not remedied, the
disagreements could boil over with the most productive members leaving (‘brain
drain’).23 Thus, while members will feel included in the decision-making process
of the firm they work for, each decision could leave at least one member
dissatisfied.
In stage 2, when new worker-members apply to join the cooperative there may be
disputes between current members, about allowing new members to enter the
cooperative, and between new members and old members once they have joined.24
Old members may not want to take on new members as they could hamper future
decision-making. It will also invariably exacerbate the problem of dividing tasks.
While not working as efficiently nor partaking in necessary trainings nor embra-
cing the cooperative’s ethos, they will still have an equal say in management. This
could materialise in fundamental disagreements over the direction the cooperative
21 Draft PECOL (May 2015), p. 25.
22 This is known as a ‘collective choice problem’. See H. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise,
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1996.
23 Abramitzky’s study of communes reveals that collective groups united by a ‘social’ ideology, like
socialism, is more prone to brain drain than those unified by religious dogma. Hoffmann’s
comparative studies on loyalty to cooperatives indicate that the same logic could be applied to
the relatively weak bonding effect of cooperative ideology. See R. Abramitzky, ‘On the (Lack of)
Stability of Communes: An Economic Perspective’, in: RM McCleary (ed.), The Oxford Handbook
of the Economics of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. This was also evident in the
Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House Collective mentioned in P Burrows, ‘Parecon and
Workers’ Self-Management: Reflections on Winnipeg’s Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House
Collective’, C. Spannos, Real Utopia: Participatory Society for the 21st Century, Chico CA: AK Press
2008, p. 286.
24 Such conflicts emerged between old and new members of two Canadian media cooperatives.
See G.C. Hunt, ‘Division of Labour, Life Cycle and Democracy in a Worker Co-operative’,
Economic and Industrial Democracy 1992/13, p. 9-43.
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should take. Some members may want to start a new line of furniture or move away
from their ‘artisanal’ brand to a more commercial direction. This could lead to ill-
will among all workers and production delays. This occurred with the growth of the
Burley Design Cooperative,25 Mondragon, and many other large-scale cooperati-
ves.26 While they will be sensitive to the fact that the cooperative provides
everyone’s livelihood, and they will be wary of imposing harsh sanctions,27 some
co-operators may feel more disinterested in the cooperatives’ activities.
By stage 3 of Co-op A’s life cycle, hired employees have been taken on and a
member-manager has been appointed. The challenge presented by this new
organisational configuration is that the manager, for the duration of his tenure, has
a monopoly of information regarding the daily operations of the cooperative and
may have to be relied upon by other worker-members to resolve organisational
problems. In turn, additional tensions may be generated by the hired employees
who may feel unsure about their chances of obtaining membership of the
cooperative.
The Emergence of Oligarchy
It is at around stage 4 that mature worker cooperatives begin to experience
degeneration and suffer from two correlated, adverse trends: concentration of
managerial power and a drop in worker motivation and active involvement in
decision-making.28 The examples of the Olympia Veneer Cooperative, the Nir Taxi
25 The Burley Design Cooperative was formed in 1978 to manufacture bicycle panniers (touring
bags) and other accessories, with worker-members being granted equal voting power and share
in the business in exchange for an initial investment of $ 2500. Over a thirty-year period, Burley
expanded considerably to include 100 worker-members and earned revenue of $ 10 million per
annum. While it tried to retain its participatory culture, new and old members clashed over what
the core commitments of the cooperative should be. While some viewed democracy and social
causes as being essential to the cooperative, others stressed financial performance and product
diversification. For more information, see J. Schoening, ‘The Rise and Fall of Burley Design
Cooperative’, Oregon Historical Quarterly 2010/111(3), p. 312-341.
26 J. Rotschild and J.A. Whitt, The Cooperative Workplace: Potential Dilemmas of Organizational
Democracy and Participation, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1986, p. 96.
27 G.M. Gulati, TMT Isaac and W.A. Klein, ‘When a Workers’ Cooperative Works: The Case of
Kerala Dinesh Beedi’, UCLA Law Review 2002/49, p. 1417-1454, p. 1423.
28 This is in line with Meisters’ view that as market values are embraced, representative democracy
creates fissures between managers and members. See A Meister, ‘Democratie et participation
dans les associations volontaires’, Sociologie du Travail 1961/3, p. 236-252; R. Michels, Political
Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, New York: The
Free Press 1958; for a more contemporary example see Hernandez’s study of Sociedad
Cooperativa de Trabajadores Pascual (Pascual) in Mexico for an illustration of member apathy at
a general meeting see S. Hernandez, ‘Striving for Control: Democracy and Oligarchy at a
Mexican Cooperative’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 2006/27(1), p. 124-127.
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Station29 and many others indicate that, as with corporations, cooperatives have an
oligarchic tendency, whereby a charismatic, elite group emerge over time and
dominate the organisation. The need for technical expertise, leadership and quick
decision-making may lead to certain members, especially managers, becoming
entrenched in their positions. Appointment of the management by representative
directors, and subsequent monitoring by them, should motivate management to act
as effective stewards,30 rather than in their own interests.31 However, directors
elected by the membership will find it difficult to hold management accountable, as
they will need to balance their representative function with their duty to ensure the
strong performance of the cooperative as a business.32 This will be accentuated if
the directors are laymen and lack the specialised skills possessed by the managers
and do not have a unifying vision for the cooperative. At the same time, employees
and newer members may feel emotionally indebted to upper management and
older members and may become apathetic as a result of a cumbersome participa-
tion processes. This may engender feelings of indispensability and potentially allow
management to exploit their dominant position to their personal advantage.33 In
some countries, these problems have been exacerbated by the spectre of corrup-
tion.34
29 ‘Nir’ Taxi Station (name changed to protect confidentiality) is a taxi cooperative in Tel Aviv, Israel
that was established in 1931 with the ambition of providing the cleanest and most punctual taxi
service in the country. Taxi drivers could become members of the station if they owned a taxi,
possessed a public license to drive it and bought a share in the station for $ 10,000. The number
of members grew slowly over the years but from the late 1950s onwards, an increasing number
were hired drivers, rather than full members. Darr found that 38% of the station’s workforce
were non-members, who either rented taxis from members for night shifts or rented the use
public licenses. See A. Darr, ‘Conflict and Conflict Resolution in a Cooperative: The Case of the
Nir Taxi Station’, Human Relations 1999/52(3), p. 283.
30 C. Cornforth, ‘The Governance of Cooperatives and Mutual Associations: A Paradox Perspec-
tive’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2004/75(1), p. 15.
31 Euwema discusses the impact that personality and management-style clashes can have on
decisions to govern the company, strategize and allocate resources. See M.C. Euwema,
‘Bemiddelingbijconflictenaan de top’, Ondernemingsrecht 2016/2.
32 Sivertsen found co-operatives to be management driven rather than member-controlled. See
S. Sivertsen, ‘Governance Issues Seen From a Management Perspective’, Review of International
Co-operation 1996/89(4), p. 34-36, p. 35.
33 C. Cornforth, ‘Patterns of Cooperative Management: Beyond the Degeneration Thesis’, Economic
and Industrial Democracy 1995/16, p. 490.
34 For examples of managerial corruption in Mexico and Tanzania respectively, see S. Hernandez,
‘Striving for Control: Democracy and Oligarchy at a Mexican Cooperative’, Economic and
Industrial Democracy 2006/27(1), p. 117-118; A. Boekhold, Measuring the State of the Primary
Cooperative Societies, Amsterdam/Moshi: Green Development Foundation/Kilimanjaro Native
Cooperative Union, 2005 cited in L. Shaw, ‘Discussion Paper: Overview of Corporate Gover-
nance Issues for Co-operatives’, Working Meeting on Corporate Governance and Co-operatives,
Global Corporate Governance Forum, London, 8 February 2007, p. 24.
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Broadly speaking, the interrelated tensions that hamper democracy over the course
of the cooperative’s life cycle concern managerial opportunism, difficulty in buil-
ding consensus, heeding minority voices and member apathy. It is arguable that
such conflicts are part and parcel of a democratic workplace but they should be
constructively managed.35 If not, they can leave worker-members feeling alienated,
confused, insecure and with a ‘vague sense of loss’36 regarding the transformation
of the cooperative’s identity. It may even lead the cooperative to no longer be a
labour-managed firm.
4. Reviving Democracy and Self-Determination: A
Holacratic Approach
In a large co-op, like Co-op A, the task of addressing minor grievances will fall on
the management (and fellow members), major grievances will be processed by a
grievance committee of the Board of Directors and substantial tensions, like
managerial opportunism, extending membership and other governance issues will
be deliberated upon by the General Assembly.
Some argue that as members are formally equal and experience feelings of
‘ownership’, they should feel empowered to raise their concerns and actively utilise
the mechanisms available for them to do so in case of conflicts.37 Hoffmann
reasons that this occurs more often in non-hierarchical workplaces because
members perceive greater ‘procedural justice’ in the system, as they have trust in
the authorities38 have equal standing with other disputants and believe they will
receive non-discriminatory, neutral treatment.39 If they feel that procedural justice
exists in their cooperative, they will generally favour collective fairness over
individual interests.40 In relation to professional non-member management, it is
generally suggested that management should receive cooperative education upon
appointment to ensure that the cooperative identity is respected.41 However, it is
35 Z. Gamson and H. Levin, ‘Obstacles to the Survival of Democratic Workplaces’, in: R. Jackall and
H. Levin (eds.), Worker Cooperatives in America, Berkeley: University of California 1984,
p. 219-244, p. 235-236.
36 G.C. Hunt, ‘Division of Labour, Life Cycle and Democracy in Worker Co-operatives’, Economic
and Industrial Democracy 1992/13, p. 35.
37 E.A. Hoffmann, ‘Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal Procedures and Procedural
Justice’, Law & Society Review 2005/39(1), p. 53-54.
38 A. Hyde, ‘In Defense of Employee Ownership’, Chicago-Kent Law Review 1991/67, p. 191-194.
39 T.R. Tyler and E.A. Lind, ‘Procedural Justice’, in: J. Sanders and V.L. Hamilton (eds.), Handbook
of Justice Research in Law, New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishing 2000, p. 65-92 cited in
E.A. Hoffmann, ‘Confrontations and Compromise: Dispute Resolution at a Worker Cooperative
Coal Mine’, Law & Social Inquiry 2001/26(3), p. 560.
40 E.A. Hoffmann, ‘Confrontations and Compromise: Dispute Resolution at a Worker Cooperative
Coal Mine’, Law & Social Inquiry 2001/26(3), p. 569.
41 See Section 2.5(8), Draft PECOL (May 2015).
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important that co-operators are self-conscious about the potential for domination
and to have a ‘cycle of vigilance’42 to avert managerial opportunism. The coope-
rative could consider using role-reversal exercises or appointing external mediators
that have a thorough understanding of group dynamics and thereby can help
strengthen worker teams.43 These are post facto remedies to an existing problem
rather than a means to institutionalise democratic principles. A survey of the
(empirical) research reveals that many cooperatives have sought to resolve tensions
between members by establishing a scheme where management responsibilities
are rotated44 and training is provided on cooperative and participative values.45 To
avoid ‘free rider’ problems, rewards have been given to active participants and high-
performing workers46 and remuneration has been partially tied to individual and
group performance, thereby requiring less managerial monitoring and more self-
and mutual-monitoring.47 To assert direct member control over management,
42 T. Lodahl and S. Mitchell, ‘Drift in the Development of Innovative Organizations’, in: J. Kimberly
and R. Miles (eds.), The Organizational Life Cycle, San Francisco: Jossey Bass 1980.
43 See Euwema’s suggestions on appointing specially-qualified mediators for conflicts among
board members in M.C. Euwema, ‘Bemiddelingbijconflictenaan de top’, Ondernemingsrecht
2016/2. The ILO also suggests the use of mediation in internal disputes. See H. Henrÿ,
Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, 3rd ed. rev., Geneva: ILO 2012, Part 11. However, the Draft
PECOL (May 2015) does not explicitly mention ADR for internal disputes.
44 Burrows suggests rotating both labour-intensive and managerial tasks, depending on industry.
Otherwise the ones in more empowered positions will become more assertive. See P. Burrows,
‘Parecon and Workers’ Self-Management: Reflections on Winnipeg’s Mondragon Bookstore and
Coffee House Collective’, in: C. Spannos, Real Utopia: Participatory Society for the 21st Century,
Chico CA: AK Press 2008, p. 279, 280 and 283.
45 Formula Servizi, a large Italian worker cooperative that provides a range of high-quality services,
gives potential members 2 years of training while Cooperative Muratori e Braccianti (CMB), a
workers cooperative in the construction sector, gives bonuses on the basis of training
participation. See M. Monaco and L. Pastorelli, ‘Trade Unions and Worker Cooperatives in
Europe: A Win-Win Relationship’, International Journal of Labour Research 2013/5(2), p. 242-245.
For this purpose, it may be necessary to build a training reserve fund, see ss. 3.4(2)(a), 3.4(8),
70, Draft PECOL (May 2015). In the future, such training may become increasingly digitalised.
See I. Snaith, ‘Virtual Co-operation: The Jurists’ Role’, available online at: <www.iansnaith.com/
wp-content/blogs.dir/8/files/2013/02/Virtual-Co-operation.pdf> accessed 25 February 2016.
46 D. Hammer, ‘Democratic Governance: The Design of Governance System for Worker Coope-
ratives’, The ICA Group, p. 24.
47 The Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative has such a system in place. Crucially, mutual monitoring
has been seen to improve the performance of those who fall behind in production and wages
remained above the market average. See GM Gulati, TMT Isaac and WA Klein, ‘When a Workers’
Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi’, UCLA Law Review 2002/49, p. 1439-1440.
Though it is important to consider Dow’s argument that certain free rider problems are
inevitable, see GK Dow, Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory and Practice, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 175. The beneficial impact of profit-sharing, group bonuses
and penalties on ‘total labour productivity’ can be seen in D.C. Jones and T. Kato, ‘The
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Co-op A could follow the example of other cooperatives and enact organisational
changes that require managers to take on certain operational tasks and regularly
disseminate information regarding their activities.48 In line with ubiquitous (but
contested) corporate governance practices, they could establish ‘advisory councils’
or supervisory committees to enhance member oversight,49 vote on director
remuneration50 and appoint independent, professional directors.51 These directors
could be vetted by the supervisory committee, have maximum term times and not
be allowed to stand for re-election.52
However, the challenge is institutionalising these aforementioned practices in a
cooperative’s management structure. In our view, lessons could be learned from
other social enterprises outside of the cooperative sector. One approach worth
considering is the adoption of HolacracyTM as a governance system (‘Holacracy’) in
Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese
Panel Data’, The American Economic Review 1995/85(2), p. 391-414; D.L. Kruse, Profit Sharing:
Does it Make a Difference?, Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
1993; S.B. Wadhwani and M. Wall, ‘The Effects of Profit-Sharing on Employment, Wages, Stock
Returns and Productivity: Evidence from UK Micro Data, Economic Journal 1990/100(399),
p. 1-17; B Holmstrom, ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, Bell Journal of Economics 1982/13(2), p. 324-340.
48 Many scholars have attributed managerial entrenchment to the informational advantage they
have. To be able to make informed democratic decisions, it is suggested that they are given
ready, transparent access to information. See Section 2.6(1), Draft PECOL (May 2015). This
could be done by summarising information in a newsletter, posting regular bulletins or
establishing a website. Important governance documents should also be available in an easily
accessible information file. See D. Hammer, ‘Democratic Governance: The Design of Gover-
nance System for Worker Cooperatives’, The ICA Group, p. 22-23, available online at: <http://
ica-group.org/product/democratic-governance-for-worker-co-ops/> accessed on 23 February
2016.
49 The ILO suggests that cooperatives can have a permanent ‘control unit’, such as a supervisory or
advisory council, to act on behalf of the members as a mini general assembly to exercise an
effective and continuous monitoring of the Board of Directors and Management. For more see
H. Henrÿ, Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, 3rd ed. rev., Geneva: ILO 2012, Part 5.1, 5.4
50 See Section 2.5(1), Draft PECOL (May 2015). The wage differential between average workers and
average managers in many cooperatives is low and voted upon at the General Assembly. The
Kerala Dinesh Beedi cooperative is an exceptional example of this as the Directors and Managers
receive the same wage. See G.M. Gulati, TMT Isaac and W.A. Klein, ‘When a Workers’
Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi’, UCLA Law Review 2002/49, p. 1443.
51 A social enterprise, the Day Chocolate Company, has the Kuapa Kokoo Chocolate Co-operative
as a major shareholder and has NGO representatives and co-operators on its Board of Directors.
See generally H. Henrÿ, Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, 3rd ed. rev., Geneva: ILO, 2012, Part
5.3.3. But also see s. 2.5(6), Draft PECOL (May 2015) which states that the majority of the Board
has to be co-operators.
52 This was the practice in Pascual, a Mexican cooperative. To ensure continuity, however, only one
tranche of directors retired in a given year. See S. Hernandez, ‘Striving for Control: Democracy
and Oligarchy at a Mexican Cooperative’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 2006/27(1), p. 116.
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worker cooperatives.53 Holacracy is a managerial approach that distributes autho-
rity, decision-making powers and roles in an organisation in a different manner
than conventional firms. Holacratic enterprises are not flat organisations but they
comprise a number of roles that are bound together, like a Matroyshka doll, in a
‘nest’ of circles. Its history dates back to the early years of the 21st century and grew
out of the ‘sociocracy’, ‘agile software development’ and ‘lean’ movements, which
prioritised self-organisation and delivering results with minimum managerial
interference.54 By giving ‘role-fillers’ complete authority over their domain, and not
requiring consensus in all decisions, individuals have an incentive to be creative
and leave their mark.55 Most importantly, addressing governance gaps through
regular meetings enables Holacracy to engage workers in the decision-making
process and clarify the members, board and management’s role and responsibili-
ties.56 Participants in this organizational structure may feel more in control over
issues that directly influence their work life. Its proponents, like the billion dollar
online clothing retailer Zappos, valorise the system’s encouragement of self-help,
53 This derives from the term holarchy. According to Koestler, a holon is a ‘whole that is a part of a
larger whole’ while holarchy is the ‘connection between these holons’. See A. Koestler, The Ghost
in the Machine, New York: Macmillan 1968. Drawing inspiration from how nature organises itself
(i.e. cells are a holon and they collective comprise an organ which is another holon, etc.),
holarchies seek to ‘simultaneously honour autonomy and collaboration at every level of scale’.
See HolacracyOne LLC, ‘Holacracy: Discover A Better Way of Working’, Introductory White Paper,
p. 7, available online at: <www.holacracy.org/whitepaper> accessed on 23 February 2016; also
see B.J. Robertson, Holacracy: The New Management System for a Rapidly Changing World, New
York: Henry Holt and Company 2015, p. 38-39.
54 See B.J. Robertson, ‘History of Holacracy: The Discovery of an Evolutionary Algorithm’, Holacracy
Blog, June 2014, available online at: <https://blog.holacracy.org/history-of-holacracy-c7a8489f8eca#.
s8v6k53wb> accessed on 25 February 2016. The idea of teams as circles, elected representatives and
structured decision making was inspired by Gerard Endenburg’s conception of sociocracy in the
Netherlands in 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., G. Endenburg, Sociocracy as Social Design, Delft: Eburon
1998; Holacracy is distinguished from sociocracy in the manner it distinguishes roles from persons
and eschews a formal manager.
55 Art. 1.3, 1.4 and 2.1.2 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
56 The ICA Group’s guide on democratic governance suggests delineating decision-making in a
cooperative pursuant to extensiveness, significance and grievability tests. See D. Hammer,
‘Democratic Governance: The Design of Governance System for Worker Cooperatives’, The ICA
Group, p. 16-22; Also see C. Cornforth, ‘The Governance of Cooperatives and Mutual Associa-
tions: A Paradox Perspective’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2004/75(1), p. 11-32;
C. Cornforth and C. Edwards, Good Governance: Developing Effective Board-Management Relations
in Public and Voluntary Organisations, London: CIMA 1998; M.A. Harris, ‘Exploring the Role of
Boards Using Total Activities Analysis’, Nonprofit Management and Leadership 1993/3(3),
p. 269-282.
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its transparency and agility and for being responsive to demands for a sustainable
economy.57
Holacracy and Co-op A
Its structure and potential to revive flagging democratic practices is best illustrated
through the example of Co-op A. If the cooperative ratifies Holacracy’s constitution
(‘Constitution’) in its articles of association or bylaws, each worker will fill a role in
the organisation. This role will have certain functions (its ‘domain’) that it is
responsible for (its ‘accountabilities’) to fulfil the purpose of its team (‘circle’)58 and
organisation (as determined in the Constitution).59 The role comes with the
authority to control and regulate the domain that is connected to the role. Each
‘role-filler’ can establish role policies that describe how others may impact their
domain. These policies have to be put forward in a forum that is convenient for
those that are impacted by the domain and may not violate the policies of the circle.
As a result the role-filler has considerable influence on the realisation of his/her
tasks, without having the brand of uninhibited freedom that could harm the
interest of involved parties and without a manager that (solely) decides how things
should be done.
There can be many circles and different levels of circles may exist. A circle may
have (a) sub-circle(s) thereby being a ‘super-circle’ in relation to the narrower circle.
A driver, for example, could have a ‘transport’ role, with the accountability of
transporting raw materials to the workplace on time. The role he or she fills would
be part of the transport circle, along with other drivers and loaders, and the
transport circle would be a sub-circle of the Co-op A super-circle ‘logistics’. (For
simplicity’s sake, we identify only one sub-circle and super-circle relationship but
there can be levels in-between).
There are, of course, multiple circles involved in the multi-faceted activities of the
Co-op. One circle would be responsible for logistics, another for design, another for
manufacturing and so on. Each circle would have a leading person called the ‘lead
link’ who assigns roles, monitors individual suitability to fulfil a role, assess
performance, strategizes and allocates resources.60 Alongside this lead link role,
57 B.J. Robertson, Holacracy: The New Management System for a Rapidly Changing World, New York:
Henry Holt and Company 2015 p. 194; Holacracy One LLC, ‘Holacracy: Discover A Better Way of
Working’, Introductory White Paper, p. 1.
58 Art. 2.1 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
59 The ‘Anchor Circle’, the broadest circle in Holacracy, is responsible for defining the organisa-
tion’s overall purpose. Art. 5.2.3 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1, states that ‘[t]he Purpose of
the Organization is the deepest creative potential it can sustainably express in the word, given all
of the constraints acting upon it and everything available to it. That includes its history, current
capacities, available resources, Partners, characters, culture, business structure, brand market
awareness and all other relevant resources or factors’.
60 Art. 2.2.2 and Appendix A on p. 37, Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
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each circle would have elected facilitator-, secretary- and rep- link roles to address
governance challenges and effectively act as a check to the lead link’s authority.61
The facilitator will ensure adherence to the organisation’s process and constitution
during meetings, the secretary will undertake administrative and record-keeping
tasks of the circles, as well as constitutional interpretation, and the rep link will pass
on concerns of the circle to broader circles and vice versa. In addition, there is
scope for having ‘cross links’, representatives from external actors or from other
circles, in a ‘target’ circle so as to play a policy-shaping role similar to skilled,
independent directors.62 Any worker-member will be eligible for elections, which
will, in turn, be organised on a regular basis.63 ‘Anchor circles’, that have similar
qualities to a board of directors, can either have a lead link or have a number of
cross links from constituent circles and external actors.64
Thus, a cooperative that adopts a Holacratic managerial structure can look
something like this:
Although the anchor circle appoints the lead link, it should be noted that the lead
link is not identical to a conventional firm or cooperative’s manager. Managerial
‘power’, in terms of role(s) and accountabilities, may be distributed among the lead
link, rep link, facilitator, secretary and the workers themselves,65 rather than
concentrated in one role. While the lead link is responsible for allocating roles and
accountabilities,66 the core circle members have the power to propose an
amendment to the role of the lead link through the governance process discussed
61 Art. 2.5 and Appendix A on p. 37-38, Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
62 Art. 2.7, 2.7.3 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
63 Art. 2.5.1, 2.5.2 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
64 Art. 5.2.1-5.2.4 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
65 See, e.g. Art. 1.1 Operating Agreement of Holacracy One, LLC for their definition of ‘Manager’.
66 Art. 2.4 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
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below.67 In our example, if the lead links’ appointers at the anchor circle level – the
cross links – are themselves elected by the workers pursuant to the articles of
association or by laws of the cooperative, then accountability and ultimate direct
member control is assured.
Thus, instead of a managerial ‘hero’ (or despot!), Holacracy requires, members to
be hands-on in the governance of the organisation and trouble-shooting problems
that may arise at its source.68
The governance meeting
The model’s Constitution acknowledges the ‘tensions’69 that arise in any work-
place and provides for their resolution through well-coordinated meetings.70 The
governance meeting of a circle is premised on achieving workable solutions to
tensions, rather than trying to achieve ‘ideal’ solutions that pleases everyone as that
may be both time-consuming and impracticable.71 There is no quorum and no
fixed agenda and those that do not attend are presumed to agree to the decisions
made.72 Roles raise proposals for resolving tensions that they sense during their
work, to which other core circle members can raise objections in a structured
manner. There is initially a ‘check-in round’ for individuals to express their state of
67 Circle members can ‘remove any accountabilities, domains, authorities or functions’ of the lead
link that may be necessary to improve the functioning of the circle and re-allocate such
accountabilities, domains, authorities or functions to other roles. See Art. 2.2.3 Holacracy
Constitution, Version 4.1.
68 Art. 3.5 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1; Stryjan and Weick were early proponents of
employees being active participants in resolving governance conflicts, especially in labour-
managed firms. Involvement is considered to be the most creative and positive way to handle
conflicts. See Y. Stryjan, ‘Understanding Cooperatives: The Reproduction Perspective’, Annals of
Public and Cooperative Economics 1994/65(1), p. 68-69, 76; K.E. Weick, The Social Psychology of
Organizing, Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley 1979.
69 Tensions being defined as the gap between real/current results and potential results. See
Art. 1.2.1 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1. In the case of the transport sub circle, for example,
this can range from clarifying which driver has to pick up a consignment of mahogany wood to
creating new roles altogether.
70 Aside from governance meetings, there are also tactical meetings for circle member to keep
abreast of different projects and move forward with new actions, meetings for strategy and inter-
circle meetings for significant tensions that need to be addressed at a super circle or anchor
circle level.
71 Hernandez, for instance, noted that meetings in the Pascual cooperative in Mexico lasted for
4-10 hours, where many members fell asleep and had to be coerced into attending under the
threat of losing food coupons. This was because the members sought to discuss every issue,
vote and achieve a consensus. See S. Hernandez, ‘Striving for Control: Democracy and Oligarchy
at a Mexican Cooperative’, Economic and Industrial Democracy 2006/27(1), p. 122, 125.
72 Art. 3.3.2, 3.3.4 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1. However, core circle members are strongly
encouraged to participate in meetings.
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mind and a short ‘administrative concerns’ round to set a framework for the
meeting. The facilitator then allows the members to very briefly raise the tensions
they have noted as a means to build an agenda. These items are then considered in
the order they have been expressed through ‘integrative decision making’,73 with
the member presenting their proposal for resolving a tension and the others being
given an opportunity to ask for clarifications, suggest amendments and potentially
raise objections from the perspective of the roles they fill. The facilitator ensures
that everyone gets an opportunity to speak, but without allowing it to devolve into
an open discussion. The facilitator also tests the reasonableness and validity of both
proposals and objections,74 in terms of whether it will harm the circle or push its
activities backwards. If both are found to be valid, then a proposal will usually
integrate the objections so far as it can still resolve the highlighted tension. This
strikes a balance between listening to minority voices and considering majority
concerns. If such a governance process is adopted in a cooperative’s managerial
structure, co-operators can get through many agenda items in a brief period of
time, address tensions and avoid the deadlock that can often arise when consensus
is sought.75
Holacracy and worker cooperatives
While Holacracy was developed with orthodox hierarchical organisations in mind,
where workers do not have a (substantial) say in how the work is done or the overall
direction the organisation takes, it provides a model that is flexible enough to
extend to worker cooperatives.76 This is because considerable discretion is left to
the decisions of ratifying members and key decisions can be made at governance
meetings. As it is simply an ‘operating system’ for an organisation, it allows for
policies (e.g. compensation, dismissal) to be transitioned from the earlier form of
organisation, as long as they are first adopted using the governance process.77
Other important changes can also be made by the ratifying members. For instance,
instead of only core circle members participating in the governance process, all
worker-members can be entitled to participate, raise proposals and objections.
Though self-managing teams can already be found in some cooperatives,78
Holacracy’s chief contribution may be the nudge it gives co-operators to rethink the
scope of their roles, reconsider the manner in which they holds meetings and
redefine the extent of managerial authority. By adopting the Holacracy constitution in
a cooperative’s articles of association or bylaws, co-operators will entrench ‘partici-
73 Art. 3.3.5 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
74 Art. 3.2.3, 3.2.5 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
75 B.J. Robertson, Holacracy: The New Management System for a Rapidly Changing World, New York:
Henry Holt and Company 2015, p. 25.
76 See the scope for amending the Constitution in Art. 5.5 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
77 Art. 5.5 Holacracy Constitution, Version 4.1.
78 See the management structures mentioned in Cooperatives UK, The Worker Cooperative Code,
2012.
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patory consciousness’79 in practice, as it fosters a process of conscientization,
confrontation, negotiation and settlement.80 Moreover, creating interlocked circles
mirrors the practice of large cooperatives like Mondragon that encourage their
constituent cooperatives to splinter into subordinate sections or new sustaining
ventures in a bid to retain workplace democracy and improve financial performance.81
Holacracy is still in its formative years and is not without its detractors. Some
contend that it will only work in small, creative and fast-growing companies, rather
than larger, orthodox firms.82 Whether this is true or not remains to be seen.
However, worker cooperatives are not founded with the objective of replicating the
practices and culture of conventional firms. Ultimately, worker cooperatives seek to
create a workplace environment that cannot be found elsewhere83 and are both
‘nicer and better’ than rival companies.84 A holacratic cooperative could potentially
create just such an environment – maybe in the next 25 years or so!
79 This is characterized by self-reliance, flexibility, the ability to notice trends, an attachment to
working with others, a capacity to admit to errors and a willingness to learn. See P. Bernstein,
Workplace Democratization: Its Internal Dynamics, New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1980,
p. 93; R.J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press 1976.
80 See A. Curle, Making Peace, London: Tavistock 1971.
81 A. Guiterrez-Johnson, ‘The Mondragon Model of Cooperative Enterprise: Considerations Concer-
ning Its Success and Transferability’, Changing Work 1984/1(1), p. 35-41. When writing about
‘guilds’, Marx also recommended that existing guilds could split up into subordinate sections or
establish new guilds for the purpose of further dividing labour. See G-Z. Sun (ed.), Readings in the
Economics of Labor: The Classical Tradition, 1st ed., World Scientific Publishing 2005, p. 186.
82 Schumpter, ‘The holes in holacracy’, The Economist 5 July 2014.
83 See the committee established to plan ‘fun’ activities in the South Mountain Company (SMC), a
well-established and prosperous architecture and building cooperative in Wisconsin, mentioned
in Berner et al., ‘Successful Cooperative Ownership Transitions: Case Studies on the Conversion
of Privately Held Business to Worker Cooperatives’, Case Studies from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison Center for Cooperatives, March 2015, p. 11-12; also see E.A. Hoffmann, ‘The Ironic Value
of Loyalty: Dispute Resolution Strategies in Worker Cooperatives and Conventional Organiza-
tions’, Non-profit Management & Leadership 2006/17(2), p. 165, 176.
84 Senior management of a labour-managed firm expressed such an intention. See J. Storey,
I. Basterretxea and G. Salaman, ‘Managing and Resisting “Degeneration” in Employee-Owned
Businesses: A Comparative Study of Two Large Retailers in Spain and the United Kingdom’,
Organization 2014/21(5), p. 633.
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